

ization is also promoted in kindergartens and mixed schools with parallel classes of Russian and Latvian where children are encouraged to befriend each other in the Russian tongue.

However, asserts the author, Latvian resistance to Moscow's pressure for Russification is equally strong, the young generation not excluded. In institutions of higher education Latvian students still hold a majority of 64.4%, despite favorite treatment bestowed by the regime on Russians. Dr. Kalnins concludes that the next two decades (provided Soviet Russian domination will last that long) will show whether the Latvian people will be able to maintain their slim majority on their ancient native soil. However, regardless of what the future holds in store, no mass conversion of the Latvian nation to Soviet Russian belief will ever occur, as long as a breath of national spirit prevails. The Red Muscovites of today will hardly succeed where their equally reactionary Czarist predecessors failed: namely, to bend the subjected nations of Holy Russia under the reign of one ruler, one creed, and one people.

Mr. Speaker, as I have indicated to the Members, I will continue to emphasize Latvia and other victims of Soviet policy since the foreign policy of the Soviet States remains dedicated to the self-determination of peoples. I will not give legal sanction to Soviet rule of Latvia and its neighboring states of Lithuania and Estonia.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT—SOME ABUSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(Mr. ASHBROOK (at the request of Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, in his recently published book, "Memoirs, 1925-1950," George F. Kennan, whose credentials in the academic, the foreign affairs, and the liberal community can hardly be questioned and whose present view toward the U.S.S.R. hews to the "mellow" line, refers to the purge in mid-1937 in which the realistic "hardliners" in the State Department's Russian division were shunted aside by pro-Soviet replacements:

For here, if ever, was a point at which there was indeed the smell of Soviet influence, or strongly pro-Soviet influences somewhere in the higher reaches of the government.

In view of the nature of the following remarks this illustration is not meant to infer that the same conditions obtain at State today, but merely serves to indicate that cliques and coteries are nothing new in that Department. However, considering the revelations of the past month or so concerning the Runge and the Philby-Burgess-Maclean spy cases, lax security practices in an agency as sensitive as State warrant review and corrective action. Because some of the outrageous abuses that have been perpetrated at State over the last few years have not received adequate attention or publicity, I think it is advisable to comment on the situation and offer possible recommendations. The unparalleled successes of Soviet espionage over the years should have resulted in a highly refined security system at State, but recent experiences in-

dicate that coverups of security violations and purges of qualified security personnel have provided a possible fertile field for Communist penetration. A brief review of the Philby-Burgess-Maclean case will provide a background against which our own security problems at State should be evaluated.

PHILBY, BURGESS, AND MACLEAN

The vital need for unbreachable security procedures has been pointed up during the past two decades by many cases of defections, disappearances, suicides, arrests, scandals and the like, but nowhere, not even in the phenomenal Richard Sorge case, have there been situations to rival those of Harold (Kim) Philby, Guy Burgess, and Don Maclean.

These three men managed to accumulate well over 50 years of communism and aim their spying efforts at the heart of both British and American security. All three were members of the British Foreign Service and all three managed to defect to the Soviet Union, the land of their allegiance.

Donald D. Maclean first entered the British Foreign Service in 1935, shortly after he left Trinity College, Cambridge, where he had a "distinguished academic record." He was stationed in Cairo. Guy F. Burgess entered the Foreign Service as a temporary employee in 1947. His record at Trinity College was described as "brilliant."

For years the 'damage done by these men has been either hushed or minimized and their backgrounds said to be clear of Communist leanings, at least in the eyes of the security office responsible for their activities.

To the Communists, however, they were picked up early, doubtless well indoctrinated, and used to their fullest extent. While British security did not know of the Communist sympathies of Burgess and Maclean, the Communists latched on to them at Cambridge.

Vladimir M. Petrov, a Soviet MVD agent in Australia who defected to the west on April 3, 1954, clarified the backgrounds and activities of the two spies in these excerpted statements of sworn testimony:

Burgess and Maclean were long term agents who had each been independently recruited to work for Soviet intelligence in their student days at Cambridge University.

Their flight was planned and directed from Moscow.

(During a period in London after the War) Burgess was bringing out brief cases full of Foreign Office documents, which were photographed in the Soviet Embassy and quickly returned to him.

Petrov stated that he received this information directly from an assistant in the Embassy, Filipp Kislitsyn, who was involved with receiving the stolen documents. In fact, Kislitsyn was an MVD cipher clerk in the Soviet Embassy in London and, Petrov stated:

Kislitsyn used to decipher the more urgent information and cable it to Moscow; the rest he prepared for despatch by courier in the diplomatic bag.

This same Kislitsyn was later recalled to Moscow and trained to handle a special one-man section of the top-secret archives.

Petrov continues:

This section was devoted solely to the great quantity of material supplied by Maclean and Burgess. Much of it had not even been translated or distributed to the Ministries concerned, but Kislitsyn used to show particular files and documents to high-ranking officials who visited his section for the purpose.

This testimony reveals the vast amount of information which the informers passed on. The next question is, of course, What information was involved and what damage did it do?

The cost of the security breaches through which Burgess and Maclean moved is indicated not only by their positions in the respective senior and junior service corps, but by their connections with another British traitor, Harold Philby.

"Kim" Philby's exploits over 30 years as a Soviet agent can be compared only with the celebrated Japan-based spy, Richard Sorge. Philby came to Washington as temporary first secretary a few months before Burgess, an old friend—all three were acquainted from Cambridge. From this vantage point he became the third man in the defection plot. Philby, too, had been thoroughly immersed in communism during his Cambridge days, and like the other two, it took. After leaving Cambridge he took years fashioning an elaborate cover-up of his leanings toward communism which included pro-Nazi associations and journalistic service in Franco's Spain. He was so successful that Franco gave him a state decoration which he was known to display.

Philby managed to gain access to British security—the lifetime task given him by the Communists—in the summer of 1941 and was assigned to head up counterespionage in the Iberian section. Philby later became the link between British Secret Intelligence Service and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

It was in this position that Philby had access to a secret report from MI5—the counterespionage section—naming Maclean as the principal suspect in a 2-year-old security leak investigation. The logical chain then had Philby relating the secret information to Burgess and Burgess passing it on to Maclean.

Philby was asked to resign from the British Foreign Service in July of 1951 and the "third man" case, according to Prime Minister MacMillan some time later, was both denied and closed.

Thirteen years later Philby defected to the Soviet Union from his post as journalist in the Middle East with the Economist and the Observer, a position taken after the reported separation mentioned above. But it was at the time of the defection, and now generally believed as common knowledge, that Philby had still maintained working connections with British security and had never been taken off the payroll. This would extend his stint as a traitor to a full 30 years: 1933 to 1963, many of them in the Foreign Service.

I will make a more complete presentation of the backgrounds and associations of Philby, Burgess, and Maclean at a later date. At this point it is more important to examine the effects which lax,